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The Economic Crisis and its Effects on the Attitudes of 
Italian Political Elites Towards the EU  
Nicolò Conti, Maurizio Cotta & Luca Verzichelli ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Wirtschaftskrise und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Einstellungen 
der italienischen politischen Eliten gegenüber der EU«. The Italian case is an in-
teresting one for the study of the effects of the economic crisis on the atti-
tudes of political elites. The crisis has been an important intervening factor in 
the process of domestic party system change. The responses to the challenges 
of EU-led austerity measures have been at the core of the discussion preceding 
the 2013 elections, whose results marked a turning point for the Italian politi-
cal system, with protest votes peaking and new populist parties emerging. This 
article shows that, despite the domestic political turmoil, most of the markers 
of the traditional support of the Italian political elites for European integration 
are still unequivocal. These elites appear much more pro-European than the 
Italian public; even the representatives of the populist parties do not hold radi-
cal views that may reverse the past Italian history within the EU. At the same 
time, however, multivariate analyses of the determinants of elite attitudes 
show significant party variations. This brings us to speculate on some possible 
scenarios of gradual departure from the classic elite posture of acquiescence 
towards the EU. 
Keywords: Italian elites, EU, survey, Euroscepticism, crisis. 
1.  Introduction 
In Italy, elite attitudes towards European integration have only rarely been 
analysed empirically. This has caused an important flaw in the literature, because 
a central actor of democratic representation and European integration (on the role 
of elites as engine of the EU process see Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, Haller 
2008, Hooghe and Marks 2008) is often missing in research.1 In the article, we 
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close this gap by matching the analysis of two elite surveys conducted in the past 
decade with a more recent survey. With the help of these three waves, we can 
contrast the present attitudes of Italian elites with those that have emerged in the 
past two parliamentary terms and assess patterns of continuity and change.  
Such an effort is motivated by the changes that have recently occurred in 
this country. Between the general elections of 2013 and the European elections 
of 2014, Italian political elites have experienced some important transfor-
mations, with the emergence of new sizeable parties, a re-alignment of the 
party system and a broad generational change accompanied by a very signifi-
cant turnover rate in Parliament, a more balanced gender representation and a 
pronounced decrease of the mean age of national MPs (Russo, Tronconi and 
Verzichelli 2014). All these factors have contributed to substantial modifica-
tions to the overall structure of political representation at the national level. In 
light of these important changes, the aim of the paper is to analyse the attitudes 
of these novel elites towards the EU and to produce a picture that is informed 
by the most recent developments of the Italian system. 
Another important factor that we consider in the analysis pertains to the im-
pact of the economic crisis on the Italian political scene. The economic crisis in 
Europe has brought evidence to the imbalances among members of the Euro-
zone. The governments of the weaker economies, in particular, were unable to 
cope with the crisis and were under pressure from the EU to adopt austerity 
policies that have proved to be very unpopular among citizens. Although not 
bailed out, Italy became the object of ‘implicit conditionality’ (Sacchi 2015), as 
a result the space of manoeuvre in policy-making was severely restricted with 
significant political consequences at the domestic level. The austerity measures 
were supported by all major Italian parties who at the time joined a grand coali-
tion. They were also forced to take measures that were in conflict with the 
policy positions for which they were known before, thus creating disillusion-
ment among their voters and a peak in the protest vote.  
Have changes to the party system and to representation altered the tradition-
al benevolent attitudes of the Italian political elites towards Europe? Was the 
economic crisis a shock determining a major change to these attitudes? Has this 
turning point marked the end of the traditional elite consensus on Europe? These 
are the questions at the core of this article. Our analysis is based on the systematic 
comparison of three surveys of Italian political elites conducted between 2007 
and 2014, before and after the outbreak of the economic crisis. For the most part, 
during this time the members of the Italian parties holding public office remained 
harmonised with the EU trajectory and showed a cooperative attitude on issues of 
European integration, reiterating the traditional loyal conduct of the Italian gov-
ernment (see Quaglia and Radaelli 2007). However, Eurosceptical feelings have 
                                                                                                                                
time (see Bellucci 2005, Conti 2016, De Giorgi and Verzichelli 2012, Roux and Verzichelli 
2010). 
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become more electorally rewarding in this country and some parties may have 
become more sensitive to this kind of incentive. 
2.  The Elite Project of European Integration in Italy. 
Traditional Views and New Challenges 
Studying the effects of the big economic crisis on the attitudes of the Italian 
political elites is an interesting case in point due to a number of reasons. During 
the past four decades these elites have always been highly supportive of the 
process of political integration in Europe. The traditional pro-Atlanticist bloc of 
parties supporting the governments of the so-called first republic promoted the 
idea of European integration as a “democratic saviour” for the deeply polarised 
Italian democracy. Over time, this position became increasingly flanked by the 
left opposition that, since the mid-seventies and the launch of the so-called Euro-
communist vision, became increasingly pro-European (Conti and Verzichelli 
2012). After disillusionment with the outcomes in Eastern Europe, particularly 
after the violent repression of the Prague Spring, under this new course a main 
driver of the left was the idea that a closer Union would favour redistribution of 
wealth, social mobility and an advanced welfare in all its Member States. As a 
result of the pro-European realignment of the Italian left, by the time of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall the whole Italian party system was characterised by diffuse pro-
West and Atlanticist positions, while any serious opponent to the integration of 
Europe or the Common Market had ceased to exist. 
Since then, and for a long time, the Italian context proved overwhelmingly 
favourable to European integration. At the beginning of the nineties, when 
crucial decisions concerning monetary union and perspective further enlarge-
ments had to be taken, pro-Europeanism reached very high peaks within most 
Italian parties, while Euroscepticism (conditional, not even principled) was 
confined to the fringes of the political spectrum. Membership of the EU was 
consensually considered a necessity by the domestic elites, in order to intro-
duce the national economy into the stronger Eurozone and to drive the system 
to solve its long-standing problems – such as distributive laxity and abuse in 
the public spending – that were often caused by political clientelism and cor-
ruption at home (Dyson and Featherstone 1996, Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). 
The pro-European views inspired by a converging elite were shared by the 
Italian public opinion. For a long time Italian citizens proved to be among the 
most ardent Europhiles in the whole continent (Bellucci and Serricchio 2012). 
In this respect, it is correct to argue that the elite-mass relationship, at least 
concerning the position with regard to European integration, was always domi-
nated by a uni-directional driver: the process of European integration was un-
contested among the public and its guidance was in line with the notorious elite 
picture of permissive consensus (Haller 2008). However, during the nineties 
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some new events introduced uncertainty in the attitudes towards Europe of the 
Italian elites: the deep transformation of the party system and the collapse of 
the Christian Democrats, the emergence of the controversial leadership – not 
always welcome by the European partners – of Silvio Berlusconi, the first time 
in government of the main heirs of the Communist Party that entered a coali-
tion government (led by Roman Prodi) in 1996 and took Prime ministership 
two years later (with Massimo D’Alema) deserve to be mentioned.  
Beyond the changing format and mechanics of the Italian party system, one 
main challenge to the unconditional pro-Europeanism of the Italian political 
elites was the negative financial outlook on the national economy. Due to the 
incremental costs imposed by Europe on its Member States, especially on Eu-
rozone countries, the deepening of the EU process endangered the stable rela-
tionship Italy had enjoyed for long with Europe. In 1996 a “Europe tax” was 
introduced by the Prodi government to improve the state finances and assure the 
inclusion of Italy in the first group of states that would adopt the single currency. 
Other costs of integration in the same years consisted of a set of retrenchment 
policies aimed at limiting the extremely costly Italian welfare, as well as its heavy 
and pervasive national public administration (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007). After 
the adoption of the Euro and the enlargement to include new central and eastern 
European Member States, the costs of integration definitely started to be per-
ceived as excessive and even to outweigh the benefits. The two processes of 
deepening and widening integration put unprecedented competitive pressures on 
Italy, imposing tight constraints on its public finances, transforming the country 
from a net recipient to a net contributor to the EU budget, and making its goods 
less economically competitive in the international markets. As a result of recur-
rent cuts to public expenditures and higher taxation “in the name of Europe”, the 
pro-European orientations of the Italians started to come into question and be-
tween the Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaties a change in popular attitude became 
visible. At that point, differences started to emerge between the centre-left coali-
tion (more principled in its support for EU integration) and the centre-right (more 
conditional), while a negative peak was affecting Italian public opinion (Roux 
and Verzichelli 2010, Serricchio 2012). Party propaganda, especially from the 
fringes of both the right (Northern League) and left wing (several radical left 
parties), started to echo the popular unhappiness with the undesired outcomes of 
integration, in a way not so different from what happened in the same period in 
other Member States (De Vries and Edwards 2009). 
Until 2013, party realignment on EU integration did not entail any crucial 
turn in the concrete actions of the Italian government (or parliament). Once in 
public office, despite a more pessimistic public discourse, parties have proved 
rather impermeable to popular pressures and more influenced by the long tradi-
tion of pro-Europeanism of the Italian government, behaving loyally when EU-
sensitive decisions had to be taken (Conti and De Giorgi 2011). At a time of 
uncertainty about the future of European integration, change in the attitudes of 
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political elites is a particularly relevant subject that warrants attention. In this 
perspective and considering the current context characterised of both features 
of continuity and change, our aim is to assess if and how, after the outbreak of 
the crisis, there has been a change to the traditional pro-European attitudes of 
the Italian political elites.  
3.  Symptoms and Assessment of Change in Elite Attitudes 
Some events of the 2009-2013 period have deeply changed the political land-
scape in Italy. Some of these events have to be connected with exogenous factors, 
in particular with the global crisis. Its effects have been perceived in Italy begin-
ning in 2009, but they have become more evident in the course of 2011, when 
massive acquisitions of Italian bonds from the European Central Bank were 
necessary to protect the state debt and the Italian economy from market attacks. 
At the end of the same year, Silvio Berlusconi resigned as Prime Minister and the 
new technocratic government led by Mario Monti started a considerable pro-
gramme of retrenchment and austerity (Marangoni and Verzichelli 2015). 
Beyond the impact of the economic crisis, a renovation of the political scene 
in those years was also caused by endogenous factors: a new wave of political 
scandals came out involving mainly – but not only – the governing centre-right, 
the political role of Silvio Berlusconi was severely undermined by personal 
scandals and some legal actions against him that resulted in a tax fraud verdict 
in 2013. In this critical context, the general elections of 2013 marked a turning 
point. In a situation of growing unpopularity of the established parties, a radical 
internet party named Five Star Movement emerged (Ceccarini and Bordignon 
2013, Conti and Memoli 2015) and in its first nationwide electoral competition, 
in a context of party system fragmentation, became the most voted party in the 
country (with slightly over 25 percent of votes). One year later, on the occasion 
of the European elections of 2014, the Five Star Movement campaigned against 
the Euro, in favour of Italy’s exit from the Eurozone and the rejection of the 
major EU financial constraints such as the Fiscal Compact. On the same occa-
sion, other fringe parties (the re-born Northern League under the leadership of 
Matteo Salvini, and the right-wing Brothers of Italy) aligned themselves with 
the Five Star Movement on many European issues. Even Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia started to represent the EU as enemy, with a campaign that made use of 
such slogans as “less Europe in Italy” and stories of EU conspiracy against 
Italian interests that encouraged socio-economic panic among voters. It is evi-
dent that some parties have made an effort to politicise the EU issue and to 
build on the emerging division that increasingly separates within Italian society 
advocates and opponents of the EU. In order to respond to such challenges, the 
new leader of the Democratic Party and new Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, 
changed his approach too. On one hand, the Democratic Party confirmed its 
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vocation of pro-European and responsible government party. On the other 
hand, this posture was accompanied by unprecedented open criticisms ad-
dressed to the EU institutions and to the “guardians of austerity” such as the 
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. Matteo Renzi was the only European 
leader of a large mainstream/government party who could celebrate a very posi-
tive electoral result in the 2014 European elections (after a disappointing result 
for his party in 2013 under a different leadership). This achievement encouraged 
him to start the Italian Chairmanship of the second 2014 “European semester” 
reiterating his claims for a different course of European governance. As a conse-
quence he changed the narrative that was traditionally forwarded by the Italian 
centre-left: instead of the long-standing emphasis on the importance of “vincolo 
esterno” to ameliorate Italy and harmonise it to Europe, he criticised the receipts 
adopted by the European Commission to overcome the economic crisis, and he 
emphasised the need of a reform of the EU institutions and of the rediscovery of 
the founding spirit of solidarity among Member States (Brunazzo and Della Sala 
2016). 
We argue that the (critical) positions expressed by party leaders on the per-
spectives of European integration might differ from the views expressed by 
individual party representatives serving in public office. The attitudes of the 
latter reflect specific motivations and calculus: some studies have focused on 
the policy orientation of these elites and on their socialisation to the European 
issues while serving in office, others have analysed the propensity of represent-
atives to “go native” European and become more and more responsible and 
sympathetic with the EU system during their mandate (Scully 2005). In gen-
eral, parties in central office and party leaderships can be assumed to be more 
responsive than individual MPs to changes in public opinion and to the eco-
nomic conditions that shift public attitudes, because the incentives of competi-
tion are higher in the electoral arena than within parliament. Hence, despite the 
general rise in pessimistic views about the EU within the Italian society a con-
sequent decline in MPs’ Europhilia remains a matter of empirical verification.  
In the article, we analyse whether support/opposition for the EU process is 
broad (applying to all dimensions of the EU process), or specific (varying 
across dimensions) among elites. Through the analysis of the multi-
dimensional nature of attitudes, we assess the direction and the overall linearity 
of elite attitudes, after the recent period of economic recession. We know from 
an emerging literature that the different dimensions at the core of the discussion 
about supranational integration are largely independent from each other. The 
article will examine those dimensions that are at the roots of the European 
integration process (Bartolini 2005, 211; Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli 2012) 
and that have been identified as fields where elites tend to offer a variety of 
attitudes, moulding a very “multi-coloured” set of perceptions and wishes 
about the future of Europe (Russo and Cotta 2013). These dimensions concern 
feelings of attachment and identification with a polity, mechanisms of political 
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representation and democratic control at the European level, policy scope in the 
European multi-level governance. Previous studies have demonstrated that 
domestic elites develop a mix of responses to the EU in these dimensions. Only 
rarely the broad posture on EU integration includes a set of consistent positions 
in all these dimensions; in most cases the large mainstream develops a variety 
of positions that are not necessarily that coherent (Russo and Cotta 2013). The 
menu is indeed rich, and different parties choose different mixes, in line with 
their own agenda and policy priorities, but also in conformity with their short-
term strategies on the domestic scene (Conti 2014, Neumayer 2008).  
In the next section we first present some descriptive analyses that document 
the attitudes of the Italian political elites and how much they have changed 
over time. In the following section, we discuss some models of multivariate 
analysis that examine the main drivers of elite attitudes in three dimensions of 
the EU process. A final section develops some interpretative arguments about 
future prospects. 
4.  Poor Evidence of Change 
Starting with the emotive component of European identity, it is useful to recall 
that attachment to the EU has always represented a strong factor among Italian 
MPs. According to De Giorgi and Verzichelli (2012), this classic measurement 
of attachment reached a peak in 2007 (92.7%), while the decline recorded in 
2009 (85.8%) did not really challenge the long standing positive feeling of 
Italian elites (Figure 1). In 2014, the same question was asked to a sample of 
Italian MPs by the ENEC project. In this new wave, 93.7% of the respondents 
declared that they were (very or somewhat) attached to Europe, and 97.5% that 
they were attached to their own country.2  
The overlap between strong attachment to the nation and strong attachment 
to Europe, with the two communities not seen as alternatives and with only a 
tiny minority of respondents declaring that they do not feel very (or at all) 
attached to Europe, is a distinctive aspect of Italian MPs. The emotive connec-
tion with the EU remains impressive, particularly when one considers the diffi-
cult times during which the survey was conducted, with the economic crisis 
hitting the country, the EU imposing heavy constraints on the national govern-
ment and public opinion showing broad disappointment for EU-led austerity 
measures. Considering these data in a longitudinal perspective, the only partial 
de-alignment one can see constitutes an interesting evidence: if the overall rate 
of “positive” feelings of attachment to Europe remained stable, the respondents 
who feel “very attached” increased significantly, while those who answered 
                                                             
2  For space constraints, data on attachment to the own nation are not showed in the article. 
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“somehow attached” decreased. Is that  proof of growing pro-Europeanism 
among Italian elites? Not necessarily. This picture reiterates a consolidated 
pattern established since the beginning of the Italian second republic (Cotta, 
Isernia and Verzichelli 2005): while the centre-left parties – the post-Christian 
democrats, the post-communists and some reformists today merged in the 
Democratic Party – have always held strong positive feelings, inspired by rec-
ognised European leaders like Romano Prodi, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and 
Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, the centre-right parties (supporting four Berlusco-
ni’s cabinets) have always proved less positive. Variations between these dif-
ferent groups appear as a matter of intensity more than of direction. Hence, in a 
context of diffuse Europhilia, the peaks of “very attached” MPs in Figure 1 
reflect the different majorities in parliament (the centre-left held a majority in 
2007 and 2014, the centre-right in 2009). 
Figure 1: Attachment to Europe of the Italian MPs 
 
Note: The survey question was : “People feel different degrees of attachment to the own country and 
to Europe. What about you?” 
 
A similar longitudinal trend can be seen when looking at the indicators of the 
representation component of the EU process. Here the analysis deals with dif-
ferent aspects of integration, such as delegation of sovereignty to the EU and 
creation of a supranational layer of governance. We expect that the recent 
experience and outcomes of the crisis may have determined a varying reputa-
tion of different institutions, notably the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment, as opposed to the national government.  
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Figure 2: Powers of the European Parliament according to the Italian MPs 
(2007-2014) 
 
Note: The survey question was: “Do you agree with the following statement: the powers of the 
European Parliament should be strengthened?” 
 
Figure 3: Role of Member States in the EU Decision Making according to the 
Italian MPs (2007-2014) 
 
Note: The survey question was: “Do you agree with the following statement: the Member 
States ought to remain the central actors of the EU?” 
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Figure 4: Role of European Commission according to the Italian MPs (2007-
2014) 
 
Note: The survey question was: “Do you agree with the following statement: the European 
Commission ought to become the true government of the EU?” 
 
The results shown in Figure 2 (a growing share of MPs supporting broader 
powers of the EP) and Figure 3 appear in harmony: Italian MPs support the 
“federal” mode of integration that is forwarded by the EP, more than a central 
role of the Member States in decision-making. The interpretation of Figure 4 is 
only slightly more controversial, since the data show a decline of moderate 
views about the future role of the Commission, and a slight but significant 
increase of the two polarised views (one strongly supporting more powers for 
the Commission, another strongly opposing it), in a context of broad support 
for this institution. Overall, it appears very clear that respondents have less trust 
in the intergovernmental method than in the supranational one, although it is not 
equally evident whether this is due to a decreased trust in the national govern-
ment, or in the governments of the other Member States. Certainly, the Italian 
political elites tend to support the empowerment of the EP and the Commission, 
even to the expenses of the national government. The overall picture of a truly 
pro-European elite, not influenced by any notion of a nationalistic defence, per-
sists in this country: even in the middle of a severe economic crisis and of strict 
EU-led austerity measures, the preference of the Italian MPs goes to the suprana-
tional institutions and to a “federal” (or quasi-federal) idea of Europe. It can be 
concluded that despite the political discourse often goes in a different direction, 
the overall view of the Italian MPs has not changed much over the years.  
Thanks to other additional questions that have been included for the first 
time in the 2014 questionnaire, we dispose of other relevant information about 
the views of Italian elites. Specifically, we found that a majority of Italian MPs 
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are in favour of a strengthening of the powers of the European Central Bank 
(52.6% agree strongly or somewhat). Also, they argue almost in same numbers 
that the most important decisions concerning the EU should be taken by a 
majority of all European citizens via a European popular referendum (54.3% 
strongly or somewhat agree). As one can see, these figures reveal a majority in 
favour of a complete supranational governance system with a strong central 
bank and greater popular legitimacy. However, the data also suggest that elites 
are divided: these pioneering proposals to overcome shortfalls in the institu-
tional performance of the EU through empowerment of an independent central 
bank and direct democracy attract mixed feelings, overall. 
Moving to the role of the EU in the field of policy, our aim is to establish 
whether the Italian MPs support the communitarisation of policies in fields that 
are very diverse and not yet equally Europeanised. In particular, we focussed 
our analysis on the following policy sectors: environment, immigration, 
fighting against crime, financial regulation, unemployment and health care. 
Despite their differences (especially in terms of current EU involvement), the 
percentage of respondents who support supranational competence is rather high 
in all fields (Figures 5 and 6). Support for a widening of the EU policy compe-
tence can be found in the economic field (banking and finance regulation), 
global issues (environment), fields where national sovereignty currently domi-
nates (immigration, fighting against crime, unemployment); the only exception 
with low support for the EU competence is health care (where the national 
competence is preferred). The existence of an encompassing orientation to 
accept the supranational rule is evident when we look at the distribution of MPs 
who wish a fully Europeanised immigration policy, despite a clear polarisation 
has emerged in Italy on issues of immigration. More than 75% of the respond-
ents favour a truly European solution, thus showing the limits encountered by 
any position of total closure like the one publicly forwarded by the radical right 
Northern League. The 2014 questionnaire included a new question about the 
preferred level of governance in the field of banking and finance regulation. In 
this respect, it is important to recall the growing mistrust of people for global-
ised finance. The conditions dictated by the Troika, in particular, have become 
in many countries (especially of Southern Europe) the target of a growing 
Eurosceptic discourse (Brack and Startin 2015). Nevertheless, as Figure 6 
reports, there is no difference between this item and those discussed above: the 
large majority of the Italian MPs, including many from the centre-right camp 
and from the Five Stars Movement, is at ease with the perspective of delegating 
decision-making power to the EU in this field. 
Overall, the data show that the pro-European solutions elicit various prefer-
ences across different policy sectors, but the “non-European” solution is always 
expressed by limited minorities within the Italian parliament. To put it in other 
words, the solid pro-European belief system of a broad majority of Italian MPs 
inspires a diffuse preference for a truly EU-centred decision-making. The crisis 
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seems to only create stronger feelings among the Italian MPs to delegate the 
guidance of many policy sectors to the EU.  
Figure 5: Favourite Level of Competence by the Italian MPs 
Unemployment 
 
Immigration 
 
Environment 
 
Fighting Against Crime 
 
Health Care 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The EU level 
 The regional/National + EU level 
 Other than the EU level 
The survey question was: “Policy-making preferences: policies in the * sector should be mainly 
dealt at...“. 
 
Contrary to what has been predicted (Best 2012) and also empirically proved 
(Real-Dato et al. 2012) in other national contexts, the tendency of the Italian 
MPs to support the delegation of sovereignty to the EU does not only apply to 
policy areas associated with a long-term perspective, where the risks of failing 
to satisfy electoral demands are more limited; it also applies to those policy 
areas (such as immigration or unemployment) where elites normally prefer to 
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keep responsibility to carry out voters’ demands (the only exception being 
health care).  
Figure 6: Policy making preferences of Italian MPs (2014): regulation of 
banking/finance sector (2014) 
 
Note: The survey question was : “Policy-making preferences: policies in the banking/finance 
sector should be mainly dealt at...”. 
 
All in all, our descriptive analysis confirms that the basic positions of the Ital-
ian political elites regarding the three “faces” of European integration (identity, 
representation and scope of governance) have not changed significantly over 
the years. The crisis, or changes to elite composition, may have influenced the 
discourse of party leaders, but they have not changed the views of political 
elites so much. On the contrary, the crisis may have worked as a catalyst, con-
vincing the elite members, including those from the non pro-EU parties, that a 
new supranational coordination in many policy sectors is necessary. It seems 
that a slogan that could well represent the results of this survey is “another 
Europe is possible”, rather than the “no more Europe” catchphrase that was so 
loudly voiced in the Italian political discourse in recent times.  
5.  Looking for Explanations: Partisan Politics and the 
Crisis 
In broad terms, the pro-European character of the Italian elites serving in public 
office is confirmed by our study. Whereas works on partisan positioning based 
on content analysis of party manifestos (Conti and Memoli 2014) show differ-
ences between fully pro-European and Eurosceptic groups, more limited varia-
tions among elite members have been documented by past studies (Roux and 
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Verzichelli 2010, Conti 2016). In order to understand the causal mechanisms 
behind such (limited) variations, in this section we analyse three separate de-
pendent variables (indicators) reflecting the dimensions of the EU process that 
we have considered in this work: attachment to the EU, empowerment of EU 
institutions, and policy scope. The three dependent variables will be analysed 
through different multivariate models making use of a common set of inde-
pendent variables pertaining to partisanship, socio-structural variables, parlia-
mentary experience and timing of the interview. The goal of the analysis is to 
comprehend the effects of recent changes to the socio-political context in Italy 
vis-à-vis more traditional explanations of elite attitudes. 
Our results are presented in the next three tables. The first models consider 
“attachment” as dependent variable. As one can see (Table 1), variance for this 
variable can mainly be explained by partisanship (model I).3 More exactly, 
belonging to the centre-left camp is a significant determinant of attachment, but 
the most significant factor (with a negative sign) is belonging to the Northern 
League. This is not surprising; today the Northern League is a party mainly 
concerned with issues typical of right-wing radicalism (fight against immigra-
tion and defence of traditional values) while its anti-European orientation has 
also augmented. This posture is confirmed when other variables are introduced 
in the analysis (model II). Attachment, therefore, has to be reconnected to the 
classic argument of partisan politics, with the centre-left more identified with 
Europe and the centre-right, particularly the Northern League, less comfortable 
with this kind of feeling. The Five Star Movement also shows negative atti-
tudes (although in model II values for this party are not statistically signifi-
cant). In the end, the centre-left champions attachment to Europe, while the 
other political groups hold more nuanced positions. However, this should be 
considered within the context of diffuse positive feelings, as it was documented 
in Figure 1, and it therefore appears a matter of variation in intensity more than 
a real split within the Italian political elite. The other variables in the models 
are not significant: neither the individual characteristics of the MPs nor the 
time factor4  impact elite attitudes in this domain.  
                                                             
3  Building on the results of past research (De Giorgi and Verzichelli 2012, Roux and Verzichelli 
2010), we consider partisan variables in model 1 because they have been found to be the 
strongest predictors of MP’s attitudes and we control for the other factors in model 2. 
4  For the pre/post-crisis differentiation we used a proxy that separates responses in 2007-
2009 vs. 2014. 
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Table 1: OLS Regression with Attachment to Europe as the Dependent 
Variable. Italian MPs (2007-2014) 
 Model I Model II 
Beta Standard Errors Beta Standard Errors 
(Constant) 3.404*** .085 6.221 11.231 
Centre left .152* .106 .220* .144 
Centre right -.177* .114 -.122 .181 
Five Star Movement -.138* .184 -.130 .230 
Northern League -.393*** .196 -.363*** .249 
Party in government    .116  .124 
Year of birth    -.031  .006 
Gender    .064  .109 
Education    .136  .051 
Years as MP     -.114  .013 
Post-crisis+    .151  .134 
Adjusted R Square .238   .332   
Anova (sig.) 0.000   0.000   
N 235   235   
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
+ Pre-crisis refers to the 2007-2009 waves of the survey and post-crisis to 2014. 
Entries are standardized coefficients. 
Question: “People feel different degrees of attachment to their region, to their country and to 
Europe. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached or not 
at all attached to Europe?” 
Table 2: OLS Regression with Commission True Government of Europe as the 
Dependent Variable. Italian MPs (2007-2014) 
 Model I Model II 
 Beta Standard Errors Beta Standard Errors 
(Constant) 2.774**** .125 19.452  16.792 
Centre left .264**** .157 .184* .216 
Centre right -.043 .169 -.073 .264 
Five Star Movement -.300**** .266 -.409**** .337 
Northern League -.263**** .291 -.352**** .372 
Party in government    .021  .181 
Year of birth    -.089  .009 
Gender    .032  .164 
Education    -.035  .077 
Years as MP     -.114  .019 
Post-crisis+    .099  .196 
Adjusted R Square 0,271   .342   
Anova (sig.) 0.000   0.000   
N 235   235   
+ Pre-crisis refers to the 2007-2009 waves of the survey and post-crisis to 2014. 
Entries are standardized coefficients.  
Question: How much do you agree with the following statement: The European Commission 
ought to become the true government of the European Union. 
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Table 3: OLS Regression with Policy Scope as the Dependent Variable. Italian 
MPs (2007-2014) 
 Model I Model II 
 Beta Standard Errors Beta Standard Errors 
(Constant) 11.038**** .359 35.920 42.982 
Centre left .150* .452 .203** .552 
Centre right -.227*** .486 -.034 .675 
Five Star Movement .097  .765 -.073 .862 
Northern League -.109  .836 -.078 .953 
Party in government    -.073 .463 
Year of birth    -.057 .022 
Gender    .002 .419 
Education    .049 .196 
Years as MP     -.059 .049 
Post-crisis+    .561**** .502 
Adjusted R Square .114   .337  
Anova (sig.) .000   .000  
N 235   235   
Note: *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01; ****p<0.001 
+ Pre-crisis refers to the 2007-2009 waves of the survey and post-crisis to 2014. 
Entries are standardized coefficients.  
The dependent variable is an additive index of policy level preferences for the following fields 
(with the EU level considered as highest value): unemployment, immigration, environment, 
fighting against crime, health, banking and finance regulation. 
Question: “How do you think it would be most appropriate to deal with each of the following 
policy areas? Do you think that [area] should be mainly dealt with at regional level, at national 
level, at European Union level?” 
 
Table 2 focuses on the dimension of representation. We have selected the ques-
tion concerning the prospective role of the European Commission because it 
offers a larger variation in the positions of the MPs, especially when compared 
with the positions on the prospective role of the European Parliament (that are 
instead more consensual). Moreover, as the European Commission is widely 
considered the engine of supranational integration, empowering this institution 
would mean a definite choice for a supranational mode of integration (as op-
posed to the intergovernmental method) and a federal Europe. The table clearly 
shows that the party affiliation still is the main determinant of individual posi-
tions: MPs from the centre-left are more inclined to support a stronger role of 
the Commission, while the two parties that have more energetically opposed 
the EU austerity measures after 2011 (the Northern League and the Five Star 
Movement) are against. As a matter of fact, with respect to the models in Table 
1, here we find a clearer pattern of inter-party demarcation on institutional 
representation in the EU. A polarisation of positions has clearly emerged; the 
centre-left is again the camp most supportive of the Commission, while the 
radical parties (Five Star Movement and Northern League) are clearly opposed 
to it. This tendency may reflect the broad pattern contrasting responsive oppo-
sition to responsible parties of government (Mair 2013). Moreover, it might be 
evidence of the fact that opposition to the Commission and to its authoritative 
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decisions has grown among right-of-centre parties, remarkably more within its 
most radical components but also within its more moderate and government-
oriented factions (the coefficients for the centre-right show a negative sign but 
fail standard levels of statistical significance). The other factors in Table 2 are 
not statistically significant.   
The final empirical test (Table 3) concerns the third dimension of our analy-
sis, the scope of EU competence in policy, measured by an additive index on 
EU-centred policy preferences as the dependent variable. Here, the dynamics of 
the pre/post crisis seems to work much more evidently. And it seems to work in 
the same direction that we have highlighted above: although Europe is often 
represented as responsible for the worsening of life conditions – particularly 
during the economic crisis – it is seen by MPs as a solution to many problems. 
Indeed, a weak relationship with partisanship (with the centre-left camp sup-
portive of deeper EU involvement in policy and the centre-right more sceptical 
about this solution) can be found, but the inclusion of the time factor in model 
II waters down this relationship and gives an interesting result: the post-crisis 
respondents (i.e. the MPs interviewed in 2014) have come to the line of reason-
ing that a number of policy sectors should be regulated at the EU level (or by a 
coordinated effort of both EU and domestic institutions). In other words, the 
answers given after the outbreak of the crisis unveil a new “need of European 
governance” which is not only perceived by the centre-left MPs, but also 
strongly felt by members of the other parties as well. This evidence reflects, 
once more, the moderate and reasoned position of the Italian political elites. 
Despite harsh confrontation on the EU in electoral campaigns and some un-
precedented Eurosceptical statements of the opposition, a large majority of the 
Italian parliament still puts its hopes onto the EU for the solution of some of 
the most urging problems. 
6.  Conclusion. Just Higher Tones? 
Although over the past years the Italian context has changed remarkably with 
respect to European integration, especially as a consequence of a Eurosceptic 
turn in public opinion, the elite consensus over Europe appears nonetheless to 
hold. The levels of support for the EU and for deeper integration are still very 
high among Italian elites, particularly in the domain of policy, determining a 
preference for the supranational mode of integration and a federal Europe. The 
emergence of several negative factors, such as the economic crisis, have not 
impacted party elites holding public office; when they do, they tend to rein-
force elite’s support for the EU. This situation has probably created a wider gap 
than ever before between mass and elites, for the first time in history the latter 
cannot rely on the permissive consensus of citizens (Hooghe and Marks 2009) 
on issues of European integration.  
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In this article we showed that the extent of continuity in the attitudes of po-
litical elites is rather impressive. The main differences registered concern the 
peaks of pro-Europeanism found in 2014, also thanks to the presence of a cen-
tre-left majority in the parliament, and the more limited structuring of a Euro-
sceptical camp that now includes the Northern League and the Five Star 
Movement. However, even the opposition of these two parties towards the EU 
appears contingent and not principled, within a context otherwise dominated by 
optimistic views and limited Eurosceptic voices.  
Hence, the crisis seems to have played only a small influence on elite atti-
tudes: the article shows that its impact has not determined greater Euroscepti-
cism by political elites, while a turn to more pessimistic views within public 
opinion dates from before the outbreak of the crisis.5 At this point, it is hard to 
predict developments of Euroscepticism within the Italian parliament. Most of 
the efforts to unify EU opponents under a common platform, for instance 
through a joint initiative in favour of a referendum on exit from the Euro, have 
failed. It is also true that, if the Northern League and the Five Star Movement 
increase their popularity among the electorate, the elite consensus on the EU 
could seriously suffer. At the same time, the attempts of the government to 
combine loyalty to the EU with voice in support of revision of its current tra-
jectory6 could prevent the rise of more Eurosceptical stances within parliament. 
In any event, the Italian political elite will have to choose between prioritising 
responsiveness to citizens (and their demands of change) and government re-
sponsibility. Although we should expect a growing capitalisation on public 
Euroscepticism by the radical parties, their ideological differences and lack of 
capacity to provide alternatives to the status quo may reduce any risk. If the 
situation described in this article persists, the political discourse on the EU 
might even become more polarised, but the role and history of Italy within the 
EU might prove stable. 
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Appendix 
List of Variables in the Multivariate Analyses 
Variable label Operationalisation 
Attachment to Europe Level of attachment to Europe (4-point scale, very attached=4) 
Commission 
Agreement with the sentence “The European Commission ought to 
become the true government of the European Union” 
(4-point scale, disagree strongly=1….agree strongly=4) 
Policy scope Favourite level of competence in different policy fields (18-point scale, national/regional=lowest value…European=highest value) 
Centre-Left  Democratic party, Olive Tree coalition, other minor parties (dummy 0-1) 
Centre-Right Forza Italia, National Alliance, People of freedom, other minor parties (dummy 0-1) 
Five Star Movement  Respondent elected in the Five Star Movement lists (dummy 0-1) 
Northern League Respondent elected in the Northern League lists (dummy 0-1) 
Party in government Respondent’s party was in government at the time of the survey (dummy 0-1) 
Year of birth Respondent’s year of birth (interval scale) 
Gender Respondent’s gender (dummy 0-1, male=1) 
Education Highest education degree received by the respondent (8-point scale, none=0....Phd=8) 
Years as MP Years as MP spent by the respondent in the national parliament (interval scale) 
Crisis Pre and post-crisis survey wave (dummy 0-1, 2014=1) 
 
